Context

This note accompanies the earlier essay
“為什麼「彼岸無機生命禮儀研究科」比「多元宇宙科」還要好？” (2022).

That text was written in response to a concrete political moment.
However, several of its arguments later proved to be structurally prior to my current research trajectory.

This document exists to mark those arguments explicitly, without restating them.

It does not revise the original text.
It identifies which parts function as early formulations of ideas that were later developed more formally.

「無機生命，網路上互相反應(reaction)的節點也，是人亦可非人。」 這些大大小小的個體從社群禮儀演化出來的「網路規範」（cyber norm）才是。 彼岸無機生命禮儀研究科，該服務的對象是一個最後會有集體意識的禮儀， 不管是國外的人民，國內的人民，甚至是機器，都在這個「禮儀」（norm）所聯繫， 又是有獨立自主意識的個體，又是全體的一份。是一種「如來見我，我見如來」的意味

Core Premises Identified Retroactively

1. Norms as Primary Governance Objects

The original text treats 禮儀（norm / protocol / cyber norm） not as cultural residue,
but as a governable object.

This implies:

  • governance targets are not limited to persons or legal entities
  • norms themselves can be regulated, audited, constrained, and insured
  • protocols precede institutions, rather than merely implementing them

This premise later reappears in work on:

  • executable commitments
  • semantic constraints
  • governance as enforced structure rather than moral persuasion

2. Distributed Responsibility Is Not an Edge Case

The discussion of platforms and communities without a single representative
identifies distributed responsibility as a structural condition, not an anomaly.

This rejects the assumption that:

  • accountability requires a single legal subject
  • governance must map cleanly onto hierarchical organizations

Instead, it anticipates later questions of:

  • agent accountability without personhood
  • delegated authority across heterogeneous actors
  • responsibility emerging from interaction patterns, not identity

3. Human / Machine Binary Is Insufficient

The text explicitly argues that governance cannot advance
if analysis remains trapped in a human-versus-machine dichotomy.

This position precedes later formulations that:

  • agents are accountable actors, not simulated humans
  • anthropomorphism obscures institutional design
  • legitimacy does not require consciousness or intention

The problem is framed as one of authority and constraint, not cognition.

4. Law Has Structural Limits

Rather than proposing better laws,
the text acknowledges limits inherent to legal frameworks themselves.

This opens a space for:

  • pre-legal governance mechanisms
  • incentive-aligned compliance structures
  • institutional design that operates alongside, not beneath, law

Later work reframes this as:

  • regulatory markets
  • institutional execution layers
  • compliance-by-construction

5. Non-Human Actors as Institutional Participants

By treating machines, protocols, and networked systems as
participants bound by norms rather than tools,
the text anticipates a shift away from anthropocentric governance.

This does not imply personhood.

It implies:

  • bounded agency
  • delegated authority
  • enforceable constraints without moral attribution

Why This Note Exists

At the time of writing (2022),
these ideas were articulated through political language and metaphor.

This note exists to:

  • preserve the conceptual signal beneath that context
  • mark continuity with later, more technical work
  • avoid retroactive rewriting while maintaining lineage clarity

The original essay remains unchanged.
Its role is now better understood.

Status

This document is a field note, not a conclusion.

It records an inflection point: when governance was no longer framed around humans, platforms, or laws alone,
but around norms as executable, delegable, and auditable structures.

Further formalization occurred later.